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Background: The outbreak of novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has been
challenging globally following the scarcity of medical resources after a surge in demand.
As the pandemic continues, the question remains on how to accomplish more with the
existing resources and improve the efficiency of existing health care delivery systems
worldwide. In this study, we reviewed the experience from Wuhan - the first city to
experience a COVID-19 outbreak – that has presently shown evidence for efficient and
effective local control of the epidemic.
Material and Methods: We performed a retrospective qualitative study based on the
document analysis of COVID-19-related materials and interviews with first-line people
in Wuhan.
Results: We extracted two themes (the evolution of Wuhan’s prevention and control
strategies on COVID-19 and corresponding effectiveness) and four sub-themes (routine
prevention and control period, exploration period of targeted prevention and control
strategies, mature period of prevention and control strategies, and recovery period).
How Wuhan combatted COVID-19 through multi-tiered and multi-sectoral collaboration,
overcoming its fragmented, hospital-centered, and treatment-dominated healthcare
system, was illustrated and summarized.
Conclusion: Four lessons for COVID-19 prevention and control were summarized: (a)
Engage the communities and primary care not only in supporting but also in screening
and controlling, and retain community and primary care as among the first line of
COVID-19 defense; (b) Extend and stratify the existing health care delivery system; (c)
Integrate person-centered integrated care into the whole coordination; and (d) Delink
the revenue relationship between doctors and patients and safeguard the free-will of
physicians when treating patients.
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INTRODUCTION
The novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was declared a
pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March
11th, 2020 (1). In response to the outbreak, a global challenge
ensued from a shortage of medical resources as demands spiked.
Worldwide, different responses were tested in the fight against
COVID-19, such as the Fangcang hospital in Wuhan (2), the
hospital ship in the United States (3), the COVID-19 track and
trace app in Singapore, Australia, the UK, and Africa (4–6), and
the rapid testing kit and hands-free hand sanitisers in Africa
(6). These responses have solved problems to some extent, but
remain highly inadequate from the health care delivery system
perspective. Critically, the WHO outlined in its guidelines that
systemic and cooperated strategies are key in managing COVID-
19 response (7–9). However, how to incorporate this in practice,
that is, into existing health care delivery systems, is still a learning
process globally.
As the first city affected by COVID-19, Wuhan fought
against the outbreak with little insight, but controlled the
then epidemic, over a short duration, with impressively limited
rebound (10, 11). Wuhan’s experience, especially in pioneering
the use of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) (12) and
erecting Fangcang shelter hospitals (2), created a framework
for COVID-19 response globally. Although some studies have
summarized and disseminated the experience of Wuhan (2,
13), no study has thus far reviewed Wuhan’s responses from
a “system” perspective, with the introduction on how multi-
tiered and multi-sectoral collaboration was performed locally
and, importantly, how existing health fragmentation in Wuhan
was overcome in response to COVID-19.
In this study, we bridged the knowledge gap and aimed to
givemore practical support to regions or countries suffering from
COVID-19 and for future epidemics.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study Setting
Wuhan is the capital city of Hubei Province and a major
transportation hub in central China with a population
of around 11.2 million (about 14% of them are aged 65
or over). By the end of 2018, Wuhan had 6,340 health
institutions (including 398 hospitals), 10.8 beds per 1,000
citizens, and 4.5 physicians per 1,000 citizens (14). However,
like the overall situation in China, the health care delivery
system of Wuhan is fragmented, hospital-centred, and
treatment-dominated, with little effective collaboration among
institutions in different tiers(detail in supplementary (Box
1) (15, 16). Additionally, the lack of a mandatory primary
care system via general practitioners and quality medical
resources mainly occupied by hospitals allowed residents
of Wuhan to have unrestrained access to second or tertiary
health services. This further exacerbated fragmentation and
lowers the efficiency of the health care delivery system,
particularly where minor health concerns are experienced.
In such cases, where primary care services would perhaps
suffice, specialized health care is being unduly overwhelmed
and exploited.
Study Design and Data Collection
We performed a retrospective qualitative study based on
the document analysis of COVID-19-related materials and
interviews with first-line people in Wuhan. The materials
included official policies, technical guidelines, and reports related
to COVID-19. The materials were retrieved using terms related
to COVID-19 (Chinese words included “新冠”, “新型冠状”, and
“肺炎”) from the official webpage at the national level, city level,
and community level, published during December 01, 2019 and
March 20, 2020. Data were extracted by two investigators (SC and
PZ) using a standardized form including the following domains:
publication date, objectives/challenges, participants-involved,
and the functions and responsibilities of the participants.
All retrieved materials were screened independently by two
investigators (SC and PZ). We only included materials related
to COVID-19. Discrepancies in the inclusion or exclusion of
materials during screening were discussed with a third reviewer
(YH) until consensus was achieved.
Authors (PZ, YH, and ZL) have been in the front-line of
the response since early 2020. Their affiliation is the designated
hospital for COVID-19; therefore their first-hand experience was
also used in the study. Specifically, with regard to information
on designated hospitals, including patient screening, transfer,
and treatment procedures, we interviewed hospital leaders and
other front-line staff within departments in charge of epidemic
prevention and control, including the department of infectious
diseases, emergency department, fever clinic, and department
of hospital external liaison. For information about Fangcang
hospitals, besides the information from author (ZL), who was
the deputy director of one of the Fangcang hospitals, we also
interviewed the leaders of the national rescue team in Hubei and
the leaders of the districts, who were involved in the operation
of the Fangcang hospital and the patient transfer process.
Regarding the community and isolation points, we interviewed
the staff from affiliated community centers and isolation points;
information about the deployment of the command center of
prevention and control is mainly based on interviews with staff
who were second to the command center, including resource
allocation, department coordination, and information release at
various stages.
The measure of effectiveness involves at least two concepts,
namely cost and outcome. There is an article that estimates
the corresponding costs (17), but because Wuhan is the first
city to face the COVID-19 outbreak and many measures are
generated and improved in the process of exploration, so the
corresponding costs are much higher than those of truly effective
measures. Also, because China uses the power of the whole
country to control the spread of the outbreak in the shortest
possible time at all costs, effectiveness based on cost and outcome
does not have a particularly significant reference value. Here,
we just used the outcome to reflect the effectiveness. Similar
handling can be found in a publication (2). The outcome was
measured by confirmed cases, death cases, and recovery cases
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of COVID-19 in Wuhan, and data was collected from the
official webpage (18).
Data Analysis
Initial extracted data were reviewed by all authors, and two
themes and four sub-themes were formulated. The two themes
are the evolution of Wuhan’s prevention and control strategies
on COVID-19 and corresponding effectiveness. The four sub-
themes are routine prevention and control period, exploration
period of targeted prevention and control strategies, mature
period of prevention and control strategies, and recovery period.
Data were re-coded into a matrix (Table 1 is its compact edition).
All coding was done in Excel. How Wuhan combatted
COVID-19 through multi-tiered and multi-sectoral
collaboration, overcoming its disadvantaged fragmented,
hospital-centered, and treatment-dominated healthcare system,
was illustrated and summarized.
Demonstrating effectiveness for each response using a systems
approach is challenging in the case of Wuhan as changes in one
part (for example, primary health centers) altered other parts of
the system (like hospitals) in ways that are difficult to measure.
In addition, measures in Wuhan were implemented over short
intervals and led to high overlap, making the separation of
effectiveness for each response even more complex. Therefore,
the judgment of effectiveness was mainly based on the subjective
account of front-line personnel: whether relevant measures are
important to control the spread of the virus.
RESULTS
At the early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak, Wuhan’s health
care delivery systemwas heavily challenged. The health needs and
panic incurred by COVID-19 overloaded the hospitals inWuhan,
and resulted in the serious outcome of limited accessibility and
overcrowding. These outcomes demonstrated the weaknesses of
Wuhan’s health care delivery system when facing the needs of
COVID-19 prevention and control.
The Evolution of Wuhan’s Prevention and
Control Strategies on COVID-19
There were three milestone for Wuhan’s COVID-19 crisis: (i)
the date of determining that COVID-19 can be transmitted from
person to person (January 22, 2020); (ii) putting the Fangcang
hospital into use and providing technical support for community
and primary care (February 05, 2020); and (iii) the day that
the daily number of new confirmed COVID-19 cases fell below
ten (March 11, 2020). Accordingly, we divided the evolution of
Wuhan’s prevention and control strategies on COVID-19 into
four periods. Table 1 summarizes the main participants in each
period and their corresponding prevention and control strategies.
Figure 1 shows the COVID-19 cases (including confirmed,
death, and recovered) in Wuhan in each period.
Period I, routine prevention and control period (Figure 1,
from December 27, 2019, to January 21, 2020, 26 days), featured
by the formidable COVID outbreak in lack of specific evidence
on diagnosis, treatment, prevention, and control strategy.
During this period, COVID-19 was seen as an atypical
pneumonia with an unknown pathogen. Workers of disease
prevention and control were mainly public health administrative
departments and hospitals. After the pathogen was identified
as a novel coronavirus, the prevention and control strategies in
this period were made based on conventional experience (not
targeted) and with the hospital as the primary first-line units,
following lack of specialized knowledge.
Period II, exploration period of targeted prevention and
control strategies (Figure 1, from January 22, 2020 to February
04, 2020, 14 days), featured by a combination of chaos
and exploration.
From January 22, 2020, following the official announcement
that COVID-19 is a human-to-human infection disease, Wuhan
entered the road of exploring targeted prevention and control
strategies. China has experienced many acute infectious disease
emergencies, including Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) in 2003 (19), the H1N1 flu epidemic in 2009 (20),
the H7N9 avian flu epidemic in 2013 (21), and Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2015 (22). Drawing from these
experiences, China has been gradually improving its health-
emergency-related surveillance, preparedness, and response
capacities. At the initial point of this period, a top-down
temporary directive team was organized, led by the provincial
governor and composed of the provincial-city-community level
of heads of health, public security, civil affairs, finance, human
resources, transportation, economy, information, and news.
The series of anti-epidemicmeasures implemented during this
period were derived from past anti-epidemic experiences, such as
social distancing and the establishment of hospitals. This perhaps
explains why Wuhan could respond quickly and decisively from
when COVID-19 was identified as a human-to-human infection
disease. Not all empirical measures applied to this new type of
virus, but the determination to control the epidemic at all costs
determined the rapid response of Wuhan’s epidemic prevention
and control, and laid the foundation to identify effective
protective measures e.g., social distancing and movement control
order, later recommended by the WHO. To further enhance the
ability of rapid learning and adaptation, feedback from first-line
anti-epidemic measures and related issues were collected and
aggregated to the central control team. For instance, to fully
implement body temperature screening in various places and
strengthen the monitoring of fever clinics in medical institutions,
requisite 2-hour direct network reporting, 12-hour feedback of
test results, and complete on-site epidemiological investigation
within 24 hours were demanded.
The most well-known measure taken by Wuhan is the city-
wide lockdown from January 23, 2020. The lockdown of Wuhan
confined the outflow of possible contaminated populations and
constrained the spread of COVID-19. But the sudden closure also
brought a great negative impact on the normal function of the
whole city and instituted panic among the citizens. There were
three reasons for the serious overcrowding and cross-infections
within the hospitals: the lack of sufficient buffer time meant the
prevention and control strategies within Wuhan had not been
completely synchronized with the closure; Wuhan itself had a
fragmented, hospital-centred, and treatment-dominated health

























TABLE 1 | Participants and corresponding strategies of COVID-19 prevention and control in Wuhan†‡.
Participants Phase 1: routine prevention and
control period
(12/27/2019-01/21/2020, 26 days)
Phase 2: exploration period of
targeted prevention and control
strategies (01/22/2020-02/04/2020, 14
days)
Phase 3: mature period




Phase 4: recovery period
(03/11/2020-present)






1. Control the outbreak




such as airports, stations,
and wharves.
3. Trace and explore the
source of disease.
4. Clear that the pathogen
of unknown pneumonia is a
new type of coronavirus.
1. Develop initial diagnosis
and treatment and










then to city-level units.
1. Clarified four types of key
groups that need to be
monitored (including fever







2. Initially clarified the
functional role of the
community in COVID-19
prevention and control.
1. Extend technical support
for COVID-19 prevention
and control to the
community level.
2. Clarified the functional
role of designated hospitals
such as public hospitals in
COVID-19 prevention and
control.
3. Ensure the safe and
efficient operation of the
entire system and
responses to emergencies,
by deploying material and
human resources.
1. Primary focus on the
community to prevent the
COVID-19 from rebounding.
According to the number of
newly confirmed cases
divided the community into





X 1. Screen suspicious
patients who go to the
hospital.
1. Screen suspicious
patients who go to the
hospital.
1. Screen and treat
suspicious patients who go
to the hospital.
1. Only provide services for
moderate or severe
COVID-19 patients.






X X X X 1. Come into service.
2. Clarified the functional
role of Fangcang Hospital,
which only provides






X X 1. Started to form,
dedicated to isolating
suspicious patients.
1. Initially clarified the
functional role of the
quarantine point. The
quarantine points are
divided into two categories:
“admission” and “to be
discharged”. The former
only accepts patients with
suspected fever and
confirmed positive patients,
and the latter only accepts
patients who are discharged
from the hospital after a
negative nucleic acid test.
1. Accepts suspected cases
from the community and
conducts a decisive nucleic
acid test to determine the
final flow of patients.
2. Accepts recovered cases
from the hospital for the
second nucleic acid test to
avoid recurrence before the













































































TABLE 1 | Continued
Participants Phase 1: routine prevention and
control period
(12/27/2019-01/21/2020, 26 days)
Phase 2: exploration period of
targeted prevention and control
strategies (01/22/2020-02/04/2020, 14
days)
Phase 3: mature period




Phase 4: recovery period
(03/11/2020-present)
12/27/2019-01/15/2020 01/16/2020-01/21/2020 01/22/2020-02/01/2020 02/02/2020-02/04/2020
Community and
primary care
X X 1. Began to intervene,
mainly to check body
temperature.
1. The community began to
classify and manage the
four types of patients.
However, due to the lack of
technology, the main focus
of the community is on
checking the numbers of
confirmed and suspected
patients, and the prevention
and control functions at the
community level have not
been fully utilized.
Community-level personnel
flow control has not been
achieved.
1. Screen the population
and classifies the four types
of population via common
examinations, likes blood
routine and chest imaging.
2. Provides health education
on COVID-19 prevention.
1. Medium to high-risk
community: continue to
maintain the original work,
including the screening of
suspected cases and the
control of crowd activities.
2. Low-risk community:
Screen external people to
prevent the importation of
external COVID-19 cases.
Key features 1. Lack of evidence for COVID-19.
2. Routine prevention and control, but
lacks a reasonable targeted strategy.
3. The screening process is cumbersome
and time-consuming. The first-line units
are mainly hospitals.
1. Identify the population that needs to be
monitored.
2. The main body of COVID-19 prevention
and control has gradually transitioned from
simplification to diversification, and the
functional role of each main body has
been clarified. A multi-agent cooperation
model has taken shape.
1. Final multi-agent
cooperation model.
1. Social order and medical
order are gradually returning
to normal.
2. Only keep the prevention
and control at the
community level and the
hospital level, especially at
the community level.
†The evolution of Wuhan’s prevention and control strategies on COVID-19 was divided into four periods based on three milestone: the date of determining that COVID-19 can be transmitted from person to person (January 22, 2020);
putting the Fangcang hospital into use and providing technical support for community and primary care (February 05, 2020); and the day that the daily number of new confirmed COVID-19 cases has fallen below ten (March 11, 2020).
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FIGURE 1 | Confirmed cases, death cases, and recovery cases of COVID-19 in Wuhan. This figure shows the results for or from confirmed cases. Before March 10,
2020, suspected cases are determined based on both clinical manifestations (two of following three manifestations: 1, Fever; 2, has imaging features of pneumonia;
and 3, the total number of white blood cells is normal or decreased, or the lymphocyte count is decreased) and contact history (one of following three histories within
14 days before the onset of illness: 1, Have travel history or residence history in areas where the COVID-19 case continues to spread; 2, Contact with patients with
fever or respiratory symptoms from areas where the COVID-19 case continues to spread; 3, There is a cluster of disease or an epidemiological association with the
new coronavirus infection). Suspected cases are confirmed cases with one of the following two pieces of evidence: 1. Respiratory tract specimens or blood
specimens’ real-time fluorescent RT-PCR detection of new coronavirus nucleic acid positive; 2. Respiratory tract specimens or blood specimens’ virus gene
sequencing, and known new coronavirus Virus highly homologous. After March 10, 2020, the corresponding standards have become stricter. Suspected cases are
determined only based on clinical manifestations (one of the following two manifestations: 1, Fever; and 2, the total number of white blood cells is normal or
decreased, or the lymphocyte count is decreased).
care delivery system; and (c) a large volume of individuals (both
COVID-19 patients and non-COVID-19 patients) -presented at
hospitals with to an irrational fear of virus infection (COVID-19
or seasonal flu). As a result, initially, the city-wide lockdown not
only failed to well-control the spread of the COVID-19 within
Wuhan, but instead impeded COVID-19 patients getting timely
screening and health services. The transient rise in the number
of cases between Jan 26 and Jan 29 (Figure 1, phase II) could
be partially explained by this failure. Furthermore, the health
services for patients with non-respiratory diseases, like women
in labour, were also influenced (23).
The negative results above forced Wuhan to adjust its
hospital-centred strategies. To meet the needs beyond the
COVID-19 patients and to reduce the nosocomial infection,
Wuhan re-designed the roles of hospitals in the system
response (e.g., some hospitals were designated as infectious
disease hospitals admitting COVID-19 patients, while some were
designated for treating patients with other urgent or non-urgent
conditions), and included community and primary care as the
first line to prevent and control COVID-19. In addition, the
construction of independent quarantine centres for the infected
cases, carried out almost at the same time as the city-wide
lockdown, was gradually completed. Up to February 01, 2020,
a multi-tiered and multi-agent prevention and control strategy
has begun to take shape. However, cooperation between agents
was still absent at this time, because the functional role of each
agent had not yet been confirmed. For instance, community
and primary care at this time mainly helped to measure body
temperatures, and were far from fulfilling their first-line role.
According to the available evidence at this stage, on February
02, 2020, Wuhan clarified four special groups of the population
who needed to be screened and monitored for COVID-19,
namely fever patients, their close contacts, suspected COVID-
19 patients, and confirmed COVID-19 patients. Meanwhile,
the functional role of the community and primary care
and independent quarantine center was initially determined.
Community and primary care were positioned to help classify
and manage the above four types of population. Independent
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quarantine centers were divided into two categories (“admission”
and “to be discharged”) to reduce the cross-infection within and
the pressure on the hospital. The “admission” quarantine center
only accepted patients with suspected fever patients or confirmed
positive patients, and the “to be discharged” quarantine center
only accepted patients who were discharged from the hospital
after a negative nucleic acid test. By February 02, 2020, a
multi-tiered andmulti-agent cooperation prevention and control
strategy had begun to take shape.
To screen the four key groups of people for COVID-19,
Wuhan began to screen the general population for the first time
from February 03, 2020. This time, screening encompassed the
grand mobilization of the whole city, but still failed because
screening (prevention) and control were not fully coordinated.
Due to the lack of technical support, the community and primary
care still passively fought COVID-19: the main energy of the
community and primary care had been spent on checking the
numbers of suspected and confirmed patients, and failed to take
control of community residents in points of entry, resulting in
the movement of people still being common. This failure was
also reflected in the comparison between the newly confirmed
cases during this time screen (after February 03, 2020) and
those in phase 3 (after February 08, 2020, illustrated below)
(Figure 1), which was seminal to the COVID-19 defence success
in Wuhan. Nevertheless, although a kind of negative result,
it laid the foundation for the evolution of the multi-agent
cooperation model.
In summary, this period was a combination of chaos and
exploration, and Wuhan showed a quick response capacity.
During this period, four types of the population were identified,
the main body of COVID-19 prevention and control gradually
transitioned from simplification to diversification, and the
functional role of each agent was initially clarified.
Period III, mature period of prevention and control
strategies (Figure 1, from February 05, 2020 to March 10, 2020,
35 days), featured by a well operated multi-tiered and multi-
agent cooperation.
From February 05, 2020, Fangcang shelter hospitals had begun
to be put into service, and on February 06, 2020, infection
control specialists were sent to community and primary care
clinics to provide technical support, marking that Wuhan’s
COVID-19 prevention and control model had entered a mature
period. Technical support encompassed vetting environmental
characteristics of the community and the composition of
residents, developing targeted prevention and control measures,
including how to screen, how to educate and raise awareness,
how to transfer confirmed patients, how to deal with domestic
waste, how to disinfect the community, and how to provide
psychological assistance. Figure 2 visualizes the final multi-tiered
and multi-agent cooperation model in Wuhan.
In this final model, different from the regular health care
delivery system in Wuhan, all referrals of patients now had to
go through primary care physicians, and the advanced hospital
had the right to refuse patients’ over-specialized/advanced
needs if they bypassed primary care. Community and primary
care services helped to manage and screen the population
and classify the four types of the population via physical
examinations, routine blood screening, and chest imaging,
as well as the provision of health education on COVID-19
prevention. Independent quarantine centers functioned as a
buffer between screening and treatment. These centers not only
accepted suspected cases from the community and conducted
confirmatory nucleic acid tests to determine the final flow of
patients, but also accepted recovered cases from the hospital
for the second nucleic acid test to ensure a non-infectious
state, before the patient returned to the community. Fangcang
shelter hospitals provided treatment services to mild confirmed
COVID-19 patients and also functioned as a buffer between
independent quarantine centers and tertiary hospitals to alleviate
the burden on tertiary hospitals, by accepting the mild COVID-
19 patients from the quarantine center and the COVID-19
patients from tertiary hospitals whose symptoms had turned
from moderate or severe to mild. Public or designated hospitals
usually are tertiary hospitals and specifically aim to provide
services for moderate or severe COVID-19 patients. Health
administration, and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and
Prevention worked as the central command center, ensuring
the safe and efficient operation of the entire system, and
promptly responded to emergencies by deploying material and
human resources.
The cooperation of Wuhan’s model in practice combines
the integration of both horizontal and vertical cooperation.
Figure 2 is a direct demonstration of how different agents
in Wuhan collaborate vertically, while horizontal cooperation
is mainly reflected by cooperation between each agent and
command center, as well as the work within the community
and primary care. Through the big data platform, the command
center contributed to a whole-of-health and whole-of-society
system by integrating the data of hospitals, CDC, community
and primary care, medical insurance, polices, civil affairs,
communications, and other related departments, which not only
facilitates the screening of the population, but also ensures
that no contaminated cases are omitted. In addition, the
announcement of free COVID-19-related services thoroughly
disconnected the long-term criticized revenue-linkage between
doctors and patients, and increased people’s confidence and
compliance with the official anti-COVID-19 decisions (e.g. mask-
wearing and maintaining social-distancing).
The horizontal cooperation within each community was
mainly done by a team with at least five members, consisting
of community medical staff, community officials, community
volunteers, and community police. This team together were in
charge of about 300 families (800 populations) and responsible
for the screening, health education, mental health support,
daily living support for special populations such as the elderly
living alone and disabled people, and the control of unnecessary
mobility of residents. It is worth emphasizing that it is the
work at the level of community and primary care that greatly
promoted the practical implementation of prevention and
control measures. Unlike the initial response to COVID-19, at
this stage, people had a certain understanding of this disease
(through officialmedia and internal education in the community)
and gradually realized the important role of individual-level
cooperation in the overall anti-COVID-19 progress. Under the
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FIGURE 2 | Multi-agent cooperation model of COVID-19 preventing and controlling in Wuhan.
encouragement of the community team, people engaged more in
online activities to reduce physical contact with each other.
From February 08, 2020, Wuhan city began to screen the
entire population for the second time to distinguish the four
key groups of people, and more than 10 thousand people were
screened (Figure 1). From February 16, 2020, to February 19,
2020, Wuhan conducted the third all-population screening to
ensure that no contaminated population were unidentified. In
hindsight, it was the second screening that predicted the arrival
of Wuhan’s success in fighting the COVID-19, with the third
screening consolidated Wuhan’s anti-COVID-19 results.
Period IV, recovery period (Figure 1, fromMarch 11, 2020, to
present), featured by community and primary care-led COVID-
19 campaign.
From March 11, 2020, the daily number of new confirmed
COVID-19 cases had fallen below ten (Figure 1), marking
that Wuhan’s COVID-19 prevention and control strategy had
entered a recovery period. During this period, social order and
medical order were gradually returning to normal, for instance,
independent quarantine centers and Fangcang shelter hospitals
were shutting down. However, the prevention and control at the
community level had not been loosened but instead been adjusted
according to actual needs. The communities were divided into
low, medium, and high-risk areas, based on the number of newly
confirmed cases. Only a community that satisfied two conditions
could be recognized as a COVID-19-free community: a) there
were no new confirmed case of COVID-19 for more than 14
days and b) no new case of three types of personnel (suspected
COVID-19, fever cases, and close contacts) within 14 days.
Communities assessed at different levels of risks adopted different
corresponding prevention and control strategies to prevent the
rebound of COVID-19 (Table 1).
In addition, for various institutions and places, Wuhan
had formulated corresponding strict prevention and control
strategies. For instance, operation of entertainment and leisure
venues were suspended until June 12 until the daily number of
new confirmedCOVID-19 cases had fallen below ten fromMarch
11, 2020; in public places such as shopping malls, supermarkets,
bookstores, and bazaars, temperature checks were required for
entrance, and customers were urged to wear masks; hotels,
restaurants and other catering establishments were required to
extend table spacing in addition to controlling the number of
diners. Furthermore, another two large-scale screenings were
carried out to ensure that COVID-19 would not rebound.
On April 14th, the Chinese CDC launched the COVID-19
seroepidemiological sample survey in Wuhan, and the sampled
number reached 11 thousand. Later, on May 2nd, Wuhan
required all communities to complete nucleic acid screening for
all members of their jurisdiction within 10 days.
Effectiveness
From the date when COVID-19 was confirmed as a human-
to-human infection, to the date when the daily number of new
confirmed COVID-19 cases reached more than ten thousand,
and then to the date when the daily number of new confirmed
COVID-19 cases had fallen below ten, Wuhan has experienced
49 days (phase II and phase III, Figure 1), including 14 days of
exploration on the specific anti-COVID-19 strategies (phase II,
Figure 1). These short periods demonstrate the rapid response of
Wuhan to the epidemic and the efficacy of Wuhan’s coordinated
approach in fighting against COVID-19.
The only obvious pulse in panel 2 of Figure 1 predicted the
arrival of Wuhan’s success in fighting against the COVID-19.
It indicates that Wuhan’s coordinated model is not only strong
in identifying suspicious COVID-19 cases, but also strong in
accommodating and controlling the spread of virus borne by the
patients. Up to 15 July 2020, the COVID-19 related mortality
in Wuhan is 5.43% (11), lower than the average worldwide
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(24). Wuhan’s low mortality indicates that the coordinated
model matches the health needs of COVID-19 patients very
well. Finally, Wuhan’s coordinated approach has a property
of thoroughness in fighting against COVID-19 as there is no
rebound after COVID-19 was controlled (Figure 1).
DISCUSSION
Prevention and control of COVID-19 is a comprehensive task
involving all fields of health and beyond, and requires an efficient
multi-sectoral collaboration (7–9). WHO gave a comprehensive
illustration of the cooperation strategies at the international level,
but corresponding illustrations are absent or too ambiguous
at the national or subnational level. The experience of Wuhan
we introduced resonates with what WHO emphasized. More
importantly, the experience we introduced here presents the
dynamic changes of each participants’ function, for instance,
the role of community and primary care in the cooperated
model changed in different stage. The dynamic function or
contribution of each participant could be more practical. We
believe the lessons learned from Wuhan are useful to other
settings, especially in resource-limited settings.
Here are four lessons for the future drawn from
Wuhan’s experience:
First, engage the community and primary care services not
only on supporting (equivalent to the phase II of the Wuhan
experience) but also on screening and controlling (equivalent to
the phase III of the Wuhan experience), and retain it as the first
line of anti-COVID-19 (equivalent to the phase III and Period
IV, of the Wuhan experience). Although COVID-19 has brought
a great burden to the health care delivery system, most of the
population who entered into the health care delivery system are
suspected cases or mildly ill patients. In other words, most of
them do not require advanced services. As shown in Figure 2,
community and primary care are the health institutions that
have the broadest contact with the general public, this property
determined that community and primary care are the most
appropriate unit to “scale-up case management, and conduct
individual quarantine of cases, scale-up contact tracing and
quarantine of contacts,” emphasized by the WHO (8). Wuhan’s
experience emphasized that if offered necessary technical support
to community and primary care, this would greatly alleviate
pressure on the health care delivery system and meet people’s
health needs at the same time (equivalent to the phase III of
the Wuhan experience). The same effect was also verified by
the experience in the UK, Brazil, Pakistan, and Ethiopia (25).
However, although the proportion of countries and territories
that have a community engagement plan rose from 19 to 85% (7),
the function of community and primary care in some countries
like Sudan (26) were still not fully used, as here community and
primary care are still designated to support people (equivalent to
the phase II of the Wuhan experience).
A study (27) compared the anti-COVID-19 measures used
by nine regions or countries in the Asia Pacific Region and
Europe, which reported the contribution from community and
primary care. Community and primary care of these regions or
countries quickly detected suspected cases, and achieved better
outcomes in fighting COVID-19 during the first wave, similar to
Wuhan (27–29). Studies from Italy (30), Singapore (31), France
(32), Australia (33), the US (34), and Vietnam (35) demonstrate
how the community and primary care can help to halt the
Covid-19 pandemic by facilitating the implementation of related
measures and maintain adequate health services. However, it
is unclear why these regions or countries had a rebound or
second wave of COVID-19, unlike Wuhan. We speculate that
this to some extent could be due to the lack of contribution from
community and primary care, equivalent to the fourth stage of
the Wuhan experience.
Second, extend and stratify the existing health care delivery
system. From suspected patients to confirmed mild patients,
confirmed moderate or severe patients, the professional and
quality of required health care by each group are different.
Stratified patient care (equivalent to the phase III of the Wuhan
experience) could distribute the medical burden and to some
extent prevent a shortage of resources like beds. The same
effectiveness was verified by the experience in South Korea (36).
There is no that community and primary care centers should
take charge of the suspected patients and (tertiary) hospitals
should take charge of confirmed moderate or severe patients,
but there exists variance in the arrangement of confirmed
mild patients. Quarantining the mild patients at home not
only increases the burden on the community and primary care
and the risk of internal infections between families, but also
reduces their chance of receiving quality health care. However,
quarantining the mild patients in the hospital will occupy
advanced services and crowd out those who need it likes the
practice in the first stage in the Wuhan experience. Wuhan’s
experience indicated that introducing a transitional station
(like the independent quarantine centers and Fangcang hospital
in Wuhan) by modifying facilities that were not originally
used for medical purposes, for example, stadiums, could not
only buffer the burden for both community and primary care
and hospitals, but also meet patients’ special need on quality
health care (2).
Third, integrate person-centered integrated care (PCIC) into
the system. The concept of person-centred care is related to the
cooperation and fragmentation between institutions. Different
from other diseases, failures at any link (the links from the
detection of COVID-19 to the treatment to the rehabilitation)
will cause the efforts of other links to be futile. The speciality of
COVID-19 requires each participant to have a patient-centred
awareness, and to track and record each patient. Besides, to
overcome the lack of resources, the population must be weary of
seeking over-specialized/advance medical services - unless health
condition necessitates – akin to pre-COVID times (37). These are
in line with the concept of PCIC, which has been emphasized by
WHO (38) and believed to improve outcomes and experiences
for people with multiple long-term and complex conditions (39).
It can be said that it is the concept of PCIC that enablesWuhan to
realize its collaborativemulti-tiered andmulti-agentmodel. Once
people enter the path in Figure 2, the healthcare delivery system
at that time must ensure that they complete the path according to
the corresponding guidelines.
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Fourth, delink the revenue relationship between doctors and
patients and protect the safety of physicians to make the right
decisions. The revenue-linkage between doctors and patients,
as well as the deteriorating doctor-patient relationship, are
two long-term criticized topics in China. Both results in the
physicians in the hospital unwilling to refuse patients’ over-
specialized/advanced services in consideration of their safety
or revenue. During the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, the
health administration disconnected the revenue relationship
between doctors and patients by making COVID-19-related
services free of charge, and ensured the safety of physicians to
allocate resources under professional decisions. Both measures
maximized the spirit of physicians’ professionalism and
enhanced the reasonable allocation of limited advanced health
resources. These are another two necessary conditions for the
multi-tiered and multi-agent model in Wuhan operating well,
besides the above condition of PCIC.
Despite the success of the Wuhan COVID-19 response
framework, there are a couple of notable weaknesses in Wuhan’s
approach. First, the existing cooperation model is mainly aimed
at patients with or suspected of COVID-19. This has a strong
absorption effect on related health resources, which could to a
certain extent crowd out patients beyond COVID-19 from using
health services. Theoretically, this problem could be more severe
at the community and primary care level, as COVID-19-related
work takes up almost all the energy of the relevant staff. However,
a lack of related data disables us from verifying if the current
model can fully guarantee the continuity of essential services for
patients beyond COVID-19. Second, although the existing model
considers people’s mental health needs, a vital issue pointed out
by studies (40–42), it is still at a basic level by offering humanistic
care and lacks a systematic approach that is compatible with
mental health services, for instance, regular assessments of the
mental health of those under quarantine.
The strength of our study is that it is a health system-
focused case study of Wuhan’s response to the novel coronavirus
outbreak. As the first jurisdiction to detect and respond to the
outbreak, Wuhan used the experience of previous infectious
diseases outbreaks and innovative public health judgement to
respond to the rapidly changing epidemic. As aforementioned,
Wuhan’s response has many of the same features later
recommended by WHO. Documenting how elements of the
system in Wuhan responded will be valuable. Additionally, the
framework of the four phases of the response and the two themes,
evolution and adaptation of the response and its effectiveness,
cover the dynamic changes of each elements’ function, which
could be instructive for other countries.
Our study suffers from the common limitation of case
studies. The specific context of Wuhan (first site of widespread
transmission, unique health system) prevents generalization of
the findings to other settings. Wuhan had a well-staffed and -
stocked primary care service that could be mobilized – even if it
was fragmented and had poor links to the tertiary sector. Primary
care services in many limited resource settings are neglected,
and these places may not cope with screening suspect cases.
Nevertheless, the experience of Wuhan is still useful, as our
lessons emphasize offering necessary technical support to the
workforce at the level of community and primary care tomobilize
their contribution. Similar lessons could also be learned from
the UK, where the temporary COVID-19 testing stations run
under the control of trained staff could meet the initial needs of
the population. The opening characteristics of residential areas
in countries like the UK and US are different from the ones in
Wuhan, where residential communities are often featured with
limited access gates and are controlled by property management
staff. Even so, our lesson of lockdown or open communities
based on their risk is still useful, and similar measures can be
seen in countries like the UK but at the city level instead of the
community level.
Second, the outbreak in Wuhan, China is different from
the ones in other countries now, which are usually featured
by an outbreak at the national level. Wuhan’s large population
were served by many tertiary hospitals and specialist teams, and
national wide workforces and medical materials were sent to
Wuhan at that time. In addition, there are more tools available to
control transmission than were available to Wuhan. However, of
its characteristics of widespread transmission and quick control
make Wuhan’s experience still meaningful to future possible new
and lacking related evidence outbreaks, to which quick responses
are always needed.
Third, the findings of this study should be interpreted
cautiously. As we mentioned in the data analysis, special
conditions in Wuhan limited the application of a systematic
approach to demonstrate the effectiveness for each response,
and the judgment of effectiveness in this study is mainly based
on the subjective account of front-line personnel. In addition,
Wuhan’s prevention and control measures, such as restricting
the movement of people through blockade of communities,
were quite rigorous in retrospect. Although these measures have
indeed reduced the spread of the virus, it is difficult for us to give
a conclusion as to what extent these measures contributed to the
eventual outcome.
Fourth, though our health system-focused view gives a
detailed explanation on Wuhan’s rapid response to COVID-
19, more contributions can be made by comparing the
measures and outcomes among multi Asian countries, as
other Asian countries were very concerned initially with the
reports from China and rapidly enforced lockdown, social
distancing, and track and trace activities to help contain the
virus. The corresponding comparison could generate more
generalized lessons.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we reviewed lessons from Wuhan that can
be learned from a system perspective, and illustrated how
Wuhan combatted COVID-19 efficiently through multi-tiered
and multi-sectoral collaboration by overcoming its fragmented,
hospital-centered, and treatment-dominated healthcare delivery
system. By the end of 2020, COVID-19 remained prevalent
globally, with some regions or countries experiencing second
waves. Even very robust health care delivery systems can
be rapidly overwhelmed and compromised by the sudden
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outbreak. Therefore, this study could be of great significance for
fragmented health delivery systems around the world, offering a
concrete example of effective disease/infection/outbreak-control
and management.
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